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The concept of official development assistance (ODA), used 
for forty-five years, has been criticised for just as long, and 
increasingly so (see in particular Severino & Ray, 2011). At 
the High Level Meeting of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) in December 2012, the OECD publicly 
opened the debate. A new measure of development aid is 
to be proposed by the DAC at the High Level Meeting of 
December 2014. …/…
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 .../... The concept of ODA has under-
gone few changes since its inception and has 
been maintained despite the growing chorus 
of criticism. Used both politically, to assess the 
share of national income that developed coun-
tries spend on development assistance, and sci-
entifically, in econometric research into aid ef-
fectiveness, a clear factor in the continued use 
of ODA is its widespread adoption. In particular, 
the adoption in 1971 of an international ODA 
target of 0.7% of developed countries’ GNI, re-
newed on numerous occasions since – a target 
with a dubious basis but considered untouch-
able nonetheless – ensures the concept’s sur-
vival, while at the same time necessitating its re-
form (see background in Guillaumont, 2009). To 
change the ODA concept radically would mean 
changing the target (which does not depend on 
the same decision-making circle). 
 The official measure of ODA has attracted 
two types of criticism, which centre on two 
questions. Do the financial terms of a flow justify 
it being considered «aid»? Does a flow’s purpose 
justify it being considered development aid? The 
first question involves determining whether or 
not to include some «concessional» loans along 
with grants and, if so, how. The second concerns 
the range of activities for which flows qualify 
as ODA. A third question, rather than criticism, 
has recently been raised in connection with the 
other two: should all the flows that can qualify 
as development aid be recorded, whatever the 
recipient’s level of development?  
 The first question is linked to criticism of the 
current practice which sees loans with a «grant 
element» of over 25% recorded together with 
grants. The grant element, which is supposed to 
represent the share of a grant that loans contain, 
is defined using a benchmark discount rate of 
10%. This rate has remained untouched from the 
start despite wide fluctuations in market rates, 
and is unique regardless of the cost at which aid 
providers borrow, or at which aid recipients can 
borrow.
 The second question covers as many sub-
jects as there are activities funded by so-called 
development flows. Should these include, for 
example, school fees, hosting refugees and 
certain administrative expenditures, which are 
currently included, and certain security-related 
spending, which is not? 
 The third question – which countries are 
eligible to receive ODA – means determining 
whether only flows to those countries should be 
recorded as ODA. This question is linked to the 
geographical allocation of flows that qualify as 
ODA. Must these flows be reserved for a certain 
category of developing countries, such as those 
with a per capita income below a given level, or 
the countries classified as least developed coun-
tries?
 In view of improving the concept of aid, the 
answers to all these questions differ depending 
on whether we are trying to measure developed 
countries’ effort to support the development of 
other countries, or what countries receive for 
their development under more favourable terms 
than the market would provide. Effort can itself 
be understood in several ways. This difference 
in perspective, apparent since the aid concept 
was first discussed (see, for example, Guillau-
mont, 1968), suggests that at least two concepts 
are needed, one to measure official «effort», 
the other to measure «support» from the same 
source. The treatment of flows through multilat-
eral aid agencies, which benefit from the efforts 
of developed countries and at the same time 
provide support of a different level to develop-
ing countries, reinforces this view. 
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1. How should loans be valued? 
An ambiguous concessionality
 
 This question addresses two other issues, 
which are partially linked. In what form should 
loans be valorised next to grants? If a discount 
rate is used, what should it be? 
Cash flow, budgetary cost or grant 
equivalent?
 
 A loan is currently considered aid (in the 
somewhat inelegant jargon, it is said to be «Da-
cable») if its grant element, as determined at the 
time it is committed to, is over 25%. Nonethe-
less, it is disbursements and not commitments 
that are recorded in the valuation of both aid ef-
forts of developed countries or inflows to devel-
oping countries1; these disbursements include 
grants and loans with a grant element of over 
25%. According to the current measure, or «cash 
flow» method, ODA is measured «net», i.e., the 
total amount disbursed in a given period less re-
payments during the same period.
 Two alternatives are being considered to 
measure aid effort, both of which avoid classify-
ing loans based on the arbitrary threshold of a 
25% grant element. One is to valorise the loan 
for only as much as its grant element, as deter-
mined when the loan is extended. The other, 
which no longer requires the use of a discount 
rate, is to record the loan at the level of its bud-
getary cost. Beyond their technical aspects, 
both these solutions, just like current practice, 
reflect different views on what we are trying to 
measure. 
 The current practice measures the volume 
of net official flows to countries under favour-
able financial terms, that is, the aid inflow they 
receive year after year, matters for their conduct 
of policy. Rather than a measure of “aid effort”, 
the current practice tends to measure an «aid 
1. There is often a lag between the year of commitment and the 
year of disbursement.
inflow.» But used as a measure of effort, due to 
the arbitrary grant element threshold, it leads 
donor countries to adapt the portfolio of their 
interventions to fit the threshold rather than to 
ensure the most appropriate financial condi-
tions for each operation. 
 The budgetary cost (budget appropria-
tions included in the finance act for grants and 
loan subsidies), instead faithfully reflects donor 
countries’ current (or ex post) official effort, un-
affected by any threshold or choice of discount 
rate. Loans are only counted for the interest 
subsidies they entail. These are recorded when 
they happen, i.e., at the time the loans are dis-
bursed (and not upon commitment), unless the 
amount needed for future subsidies is paid into 
a dedicated account and immediately recorded 
as aid2.  This is a simple, easy to understand solu-
tion that can be taken on board by public opin-
ion. 
 The alternative of recording the value of the 
grant element contained in loans – their «grant 
equivalent» – reflects an expected (or ex ante) 
effort, as the cost for the lending countries will 
be felt only when the loan is disbursed and in-
terests are paid. But this of course means choos-
ing a relevant discount rate, which raises several 
problems.  
Discount rate. For whom? And when?
 The choice of a grant equivalent measure, 
just like the grant element threshold for a loan to 
be considered aid, entails using a discount rate. 
This rate is currently fixed and unique, regard-
less of who is lending and borrowing. Let’s sup-
pose the use of such a rate is retained. Should it 
remain fixed? Should it be uniform?
2. See Cohen, Guillaumont-Jeanneney, & Jacquet, 2006. Pierre 
Jacquet (see speech and discussion at http://davidroodman.com/
blog/2014/02/06/undue-credit-are-france-germany-and-japan-
subverting-the-definition-of-aid-with-pricey-loans/) would like to 
see the budgetary cost recorded in all countries when a national 
aid-specific fund receives the disbursement, but the question 
of the measure of aid can be separated from the management 
of aid funds by each country through a dedicated fund, which 
incidentally has the advantage of allowing the best combination 
of aid resources in grants, subsidies, guarantees, etc.
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 While it has not always been so, the dis-
count rate (set from the beginning at 10%) is 
now overvalued in light of the borrowing condi-
tions of the major donor countries, what artifi-
cially inflates the grant element and the grant 
equivalent, as well as the current measure of 
ODA, to a variable extent over time. 
 There are several conceivable options. If 
one wants to keep a fixed and uniform rate, it is 
of course possible to maintain the current rate 
of 10%. This is obviously debatable, but ensures 
a clear continuity with previous statistics. An-
other proposed solution is to use a rate of 5%, 
more consistent with the current level of OECD 
countries’ treasury bills and with the rate ad-
opted by the IMF and the World Bank in Octo-
ber 2013 to assess the concessionality of loans 
to low-income countries. But if interest rates rise 
in the future, this rate may in turn become un-
suitable and lead to most loans being excluded 
from aid figures. If the principle of a single rate 
is maintained, then it must be a rate that varies 
from year to year based on average market con-
ditions and global inflation. If the rates fluctu-
ate, this may cause instability in the measure of 
aid, which could be mitigated by defining the 
rate using a multi-year rolling average.
 An alternative preferred by some DAC ex-
perts is to differentiate the benchmark discount 
rate according either to lenders or to borrow-
ers or, better yet for some experts, according to 
both at once.
 Adopting a different rate for each donor 
country, as the OECD already does to assess the 
concessionality of tied aid using a Differentiated 
Discount Rate (DDR), aims to reflect the oppor-
tunity cost of money for the lending country. 
This option is problematic on two counts. First, 
for a loan under given financial terms, the poor-
er the lender’s rating, the higher its aid is con-
sidered to be. For the same loan, and therefore 
the same type of flow, a donor whose economic 
policy has earned it easy access to financial mar-
kets sees a lower loan effort recorded than a 
donor whose market access reflects a more lax 
economic policy. In other words, the lax devel-
oped country receives a premium in the valu-
ation of its ODA3.  Second, while this measure 
may reflect an effort, it bears no relation to the 
value of the flows received by the developing 
country. Yet the value of a loan in terms of devel-
opment aid chiefly depends on the type of flows 
obtained by the receiving country. Differentiat-
ing the discount rate by donor means that two 
strictly identical loans, granted by two different 
countries, are recorded differently, whereas for a 
given recipient country they should be counted 
in the same way.
 Conversely, differentiating rates by recipi-
ent country would make it possible to factor in 
the advantage gained by each borrower in view 
of its own terms of market access. It may seem 
logical to take these terms into account in deter-
mining the extent to which an official flow rep-
resents aid for the country. However, from the 
lender’s point of view, the justification is quite 
different. Differentiation is supposed to reflect 
the borrower’s default risk (consequently, in 
combination with differentiation based on the 
cost of borrowing for the lending country, is it 
called «risk-adjusted», as opposed to differen-
tiation based solely on the cost of borrowing 
to the lender, called «risk free»)4.  Furthermore, 
adjustment according to the financial position 
of the borrowing country has the advantage of 
3.  This differentiation, originally introduced in the OECD 
Arrangement on Export Credits to avoid a distortion of 
competition, draws on a specific rationale. As the differentiated 
rates are substantially lower than the discount rate of 10% used to 
calculate the grant element of loans, it has been used in parallel 
to restrict the inclusion of tied loans in the measure of ODA. Yet 
it may seem paradoxical to calculate the grant element based on 
discount rates that rise along with the rate at which the lending 
country borrows on the market. It reflects a political tolerance 
of tying the aid based on the lender’s position, whereas what is 
important for the measure of tied aid is the level of price premiums 
resulting from the tie, which is likely to be higher the more difficult 
the lending country’s balance of payments situation. Moreover, 
tied aid is now limited to non-LDCs. In short, the consensus on 
the use of a differentiated discount rate under the Arrangement 
on Export Credits cannot be interpreted (as does Roodman, 2014) 
as a consensus for its widespread adoption in the measure of aid.
4. A corollary to this solution is that it would become pointless 
to add to the measure of aid any decrease in annual repayments 
which may occur later on in the event of ODA debt cancellation 
(in fact, current rates are poor predictors of long-term default 
risk).
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measure of aid should remain independent of 
its geographical allocation, so that both factors 
can be assessed transparently.
 Finally, it is clear that measuring aid in 
loan form using its grant equivalent inevitably 
gives rise to a problem of consistency. The grant 
equivalent is calculated for commitments using 
the discount rate at the time, but it is recorded 
as aid when the disbursements corresponding 
to this commitment are made, over a period 
extending beyond the year of commitment. 
«Differentiated» lender or borrower rates are 
changing and will probably cease to be relevant 
for measuring the lenders’ current efforts, or the 
current benefits for borrowers8.  This is the same 
problem as that encountered above: are we 
seeking to measure aid flow ex ante or ex post, 
which applies as much to effort (intentional or 
actual) as to support (expected or actual)? While 
the DAC countries, through the grant element, 
seem more interested in intentions, recipient 
countries appear more concerned with actual 
inflows.
 As for the option of combining both dif-
ferentiations of the discount rate, according to 
lenders and according to borrowers, it is certain-
ly appealing in that it is able to include in the 
measure of aid commitments an assessment of 
both the relative effort of lenders and the rela-
tive advantage for borrowers. But seen as an ex-
clusive measure of ODA flows, it combines the 
aforementioned disadvantages of both forms of 
differentiation, and adds an unavoidable arbi-
trariness in the technical choice of how the dif-
ferentiations are combined. Ultimately, basing 
the measure of ODA disbursements on a dis-
count rate matrix where each borrower-lender 
pair has a different rate (approximately 4000 
rates!), and will probably become no longer 
relevant, risks making the measure of aid seem 
complicated, always questionable and of little 
use in political debate. Let us not forget that the 
aim of reforming the measure of official devel-
8. The same criticism certainly applies to the measure of 
concessional loan disbursements defined on the basis of a 
discount rate set at the time of commitment.
being applicable to loans and credits from both 
bilateral and multilateral agencies.
 While this option is more defensible than 
differentiation by lender, is not without its draw-
backs. When reassessing aid depending on the 
borrowing country’s level of access to capital 
markets, adjustment, if it is involved in measur-
ing an aid effort, may encourage lenders to lend 
more to riskier countries, since they can record 
«more aid» with the same resource5.  Another 
argument is to add to the debate: the riskiest 
countries are also countries where the cost of 
preparing projects is higher, and differentiation 
would be a way to make the allocation of devel-
opment loans between countries neutral from 
the donors’ perspective. In fact there is no obvi-
ous relationship (country by country) between 
the country’s debt risk and the cost of preparing 
projects that are carried out there6.  
 Ultimately, if differentiation by borrow-
er encourages more to be lent to the riskiest 
countries, this is sometimes presented as an 
advantage since it would result in more aid go-
ing to countries that need it most. However, 
while these countries need more aid, it is not 
necessarily needed in the form of loans. Yet ad-
justment simultaneously results in artificially 
inflating the share of aid flows to these coun-
tries, giving the illusion of an allocation in their 
favour. More generally, this option amounts to 
partially addressing two problems at once: how 
aid is measured and how well it is allocated geo-
graphically, what is known as selectivity. It may 
be legitimate to weight the measure of aid by its 
selectivity7,  but the size of financial difficulties 
cannot be the only criterion for selectivity (the 
choice of which is another issue). In short, the 
5. This is true even if lenders submit to the IMF debt 
management framework, which incidentally is not implemented 
in all borrowing countries, or respected by all lenders.
6. If it is considered important to take account of this cost in the 
discount rate, an acceptable differentiation would be in favour 
of a group of countries where the costs of project preparation 
are higher, for example LDCs. However, this option would 
have the disadvantage of introducing a threshold effect to the 
valuation of loans.
7. As is the case in the Center for Global Development’s 
Commitment to Development Index
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 When measuring the official development 
support received by developing countries in 
a given year – an important concept both for 
their policy management and for aid effective-
ness analysis – it is the inflows that enter the 
country over the year that must be considered, 
either the official «concessional» disbursements 
(grants and concessional loans) net of amorti-
zation, or the total official flows measured as a 
net transfer, i.e. minus both amortization and 
interest payments. If the focus is on net conces-
sional inflows, as is currently the case, the clear-
est method is to identify them using a single, 
moving discount rate corresponding to the av-
erage market access conditions for developing 
countries and a threshold which, for the sake of 
continuity, would remain at 25%.
 However, if in a spirit of compromise a 
single summary measure was sought, or an-
other, more forward-looking or ex ante mea-
sure, based on the sum of grants and the grant 
equivalent of loans, it would be better to use 
only a single moving rate corresponding to the 
average market access conditions for develop-
ing countries, rather than on access conditions 
for developed countries. This, so as to include in 
the rate the average additional cost of lending 
to these countries, whether because of the risk 
they represent or the specific costs of prepar-
ing the loans. To take the spirit of compromise 
even further, if differentiated rates were sought 
according to recipient countries, care should be 
taken to avoid using multiple country catego-
ries, which would create multiple threshold ef-
fects and would obscure the meaning of the aid 
measure. 
 These two (or three) measures should natu-
rally be complemented by the measure of total 
official finance (concessional or non-conces-
sional) aiming at sustainable development, as 
well as by a measure of private finance of vari-
ous types. It then becomes a question of the eli-
gibility of flows according to their purpose. 
lender’s concessional transaction. As such, the lender could 
communicate on the cost it accepts in lieu of the market and 
distinguish the risk effort made between a loan to a safe country 
and a loan to a risky country. 
opment assistance is to enhance its credibility 
and transparency.
Two or more concepts rather than one?
 In short, it makes little sense to use the 
same concept or indicator to measure two dif-
ferent things, on the one hand the official aid ef-
fort that developed countries provide in a given 
year, and on the other the official aid inflows 
that developing countries actually receive that 
year. 
 The simplest and most transparent mea-
sure of the year’s actual effort is no doubt the 
budgetary cost of the grants and interest sub-
sidies extended that year. Of course, it is also 
conceivable to record the sum of grants and 
the grant equivalent of loans, which is more a 
measure of anticipated effort and applies bet-
ter to commitments than to disbursements. In 
the case of a grant equivalent measure, the dis-
count rate required for this purpose should be 
regularly reviewed according to the borrowing 
conditions of donor countries. The rate must be 
the same for all donors, as two loans with iden-
tical characteristics should be recorded in the 
same way regardless of the lender. One solution 
would be to set an annual discount rate com-
mensurate with average market access condi-
tions for developed countries. In order to take 
into account the risk to lenders of their devel-
opment assistance in loan form, a risk premium 
would be added to the above rate. 
 The discount rate would not be differenti-
ated by donor, but only and possibly by borrow-
er. The only conceivable differentiation would 
be for LDCs alone, on the basis that these coun-
tries, because of their specific structural handi-
caps, require more work in preparing operations 
(rather than the fact that they involve a higher 
risk)9.  
9. Another solution would be to develop a separate measure of 
risk associated with each loan transaction to distinguish each 
loan based on risk, so that each donor can communicate on the 
risk it is taking for the borrower in lieu of the market. This could 
be done by calculating a «risk equivalent» that would account 
for the monetary gain derived by the borrower thanks to the 
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Let us look briefly at the various expenditures. 
Currently, the cost of hosting refugees is count-
ed for their first year, and the arbitrary one-year 
cut-off point satisfies no one. Some stakeholders 
justifiably argue that refugee support is not de-
velopment aid, while others are equally justified 
in wanting to count the entire period that the 
person has refugee status (it is a contribution to 
international mobility). Tuition fees for students 
from poor countries, who have no obligation to 
return to their countries, may seem far removed 
from ODA, but if higher education is not free and 
grants are awarded to those students to cover 
these costs, it makes sense to include them in 
school fees. Including administrative expenses 
in the measure of aid appears incongruous to 
some, as they finance the bureaucracy of rich 
countries, while others believe they represent a 
contribution by donor countries to the quality 
of operations financed by aid. Why not retain a 
fixed share of total aid, supposed to represent a 
“normal” contribution to the preparation of op-
erations?
Specifically treating some key 
development and GPG spending that 
has so far been neglected in or excluded 
from ODA
 Two categories of expenditure that are 
currently neglected in aid measures should be 
better addressed in terms of their contribution 
to development: risk coverage instruments and 
spending in support of peacekeeping. 
 Coverage of a risk by specific instruments 
– such as government guarantees from a do-
nor country on a private loan to a developing 
country – is an important and innovative con-
tribution to the development of the recipient 
country. It entails an «effort» on the part of the 
donor in that the donor assumes a potentially 
costly risk. In a measure of donor effort, it could 
be assessed as the monetary valuation of the 
risk assumed by the organizations providing 
the guarantees, based on their exposure and 
2. What should aid include? 
Contents of variable legitimacy
 
 Some spending recorded as ODA is regu-
larly criticized for its ambiguous contribution to 
development, while other major expenditures 
are currently neglected. For each of these, two 
questions are raised: should they be counted? 
and if so, how?
 The answer to both questions depends in 
part on whether the aim is to measure effort 
or support flows. Here again, we cannot avoid 
distinguishing between the donor perspective 
(what corresponds to an «effort») and the recipi-
ent perspective (what constitutes actual inflows 
received for development). The answer also de-
pends on how countries’ contributions to global 
public goods (GPG) are measured. A clear mea-
sure of these flows, the purpose of which some-
times overlaps with that of ODA, should enable 
a stricter measure of aid. This measure could 
also be accompanied by a target, which would 
be added to and combined with the ODA target 
to cover ODA and global public goods.                
Circumscribing expenditure that 
represents an «effort» for development 
without necessarily resulting into 
inflows to developing countries
 The ODA components most criticized for 
their dubious contribution to eligible countries’ 
development are essentially those spent in the 
donor country: refugee assistance, school fees 
and administrative costs. While there is a debate 
on each of these types of spending (see Rood-
man, 2014 and Severino & Ray, 2011), it should 
be possible to find a consensus for evaluating 
a country’s effort. In short, when these expen-
ditures have a real cost for the donor and are 
intended for development, they can be incor-
porated into a measure of its effort. However, if 
they do not correspond to a transfer to recipient 
countries, they cannot be considered an inflow. 
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 The above example shows that a dividing 
line between what is and is not recordable as aid 
lies between expenditure to fight poverty and 
expenditure on global public goods (besides 
peace and security, these include the preserva-
tion of the environment, and the response to 
climate change). Given the close proximity be-
tween these two types of expenditure, spend-
ing for global public goods should be accounted 
for just like aid spending is, with the same rules 
applied to the treatment of grants and loans, 
both for measuring the effort of financing coun-
tries and for measuring the inflows to receiving 
countries; the cursor that separates ODA and 
GPGs would relate exclusively to the purpose of 
the expenditure. The targets for aid and GPGs 
would then need to be jointly defined. The un-
certainty of the split between ODA and finance 
for the response to climate change is particu-
larly obvious for aid aimed at adaptation, but 
is also apparent in some mitigation projects in 
poor countries.
3. Measuring aid and its targets
 The revision of the aid concept raises the 
question of its relevance to the aid targets set 
by the international community. This question 
itself has several aspects.
Who is eligible? 
 The first aspect concerns the fit between 
the type of flows and the nature of the benefi-
ciaries. The uneven progression of developing 
countries has called the list of eligible countries 
into question. A review of the list would be co-
herent, but is politically-charged. It would be 
better to focus on defining commitments to 
countries with the greatest need for aid. 
the probability of default – in short, by the pro-
visions established for this purpose. Is risk cov-
erage a real contribution to countries’ develop-
ment? It facilitates the granting of a loan, and as 
such is beneficial to recipient countries. Should 
all the extra funds obtained or just the provision 
be counted as aid flows for the recipient? What 
is not counted as «aid» must in any case be re-
corded in the «other official flows or state sup-
ported flows for development» category. 
 More controversial is expenditure for 
peacekeeping. A country’s security is increas-
ingly recognized as an essential condition for 
development. Some expenditures of this type 
are currently included in ODA10;  their scope 
could be extended, particularly to expendi-
ture to support the training of armed forces 
for national defence. Recording peacekeeping 
operations themselves as development aid is 
obviously more strongly disputed, whatever 
justification could be given in a broad develop-
ment sense. The sheer magnitude of the sums 
involved could change the scale and nature of 
the object being measured. In order not to dis-
tort the object, but to take into account the de-
velopment contribution of a country interven-
ing unambiguously with the aim of restoring 
the peace in a partner country, which may be 
the case in operations conducted under a UN 
mandate, the corresponding expenditure, if it 
is not included in the aid concept, could be in-
cluded in an expanded concept of official efforts 
for development and GPGs and, on the side of 
the recipient countries, in a expanded concept 
of official flows received for development.
Beyond development assistance, 
measuring contributions to global 
public goods 
10. Currently, only the following security spending is recorded 
as ODA: supervision of elections; rehabilitation assistance to 
demobilised soldiers; rehabilitation of basic national infrastructure; 
monitoring or retraining of civil administrators and police forces; 
reform of security systems and other activities related to the rule 
of law; training in customs and border control procedures; training 
in fiscal or macroeconomic stabilization policy; repatriation and 
demobilization of armed factions, and disposal of their weapons; 
and explosive mine removal.
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extent that donors are still committed to a total 
volume of ODA for developing countries such as 
the 0.7% of ODA/GNI.
Who decides?
 Behind the question of the fit between 
the aid measurements and aid targets appears 
a problem of global governance. The 0.7% and 
0.15-0.2% targets, even if they apply only to de-
veloped countries, have been formulated, estab-
lished and repeated in the context of the United 
Nations, on a worldwide scale. The measure of 
aid is currently discussed mainly in the DAC of 
the OECD, the rich countries’ club. It seems diffi-
cult that a new measure of aid could be adopted 
by the CAD without being endorsed within the 
broader UN framework, which alone can judge 
the consistency of the concept with the objec-
tives of the international community.
 The OECD chiefly focuses on an aid concept 
which enables the measurement and compari-
son of the aid efforts of its members, and it is 
legitimate in doing so. Developing countries, 
along with the UN, are concerned with measure-
ment of the inflows they receive, which is also a 
legitimate concern. The aid target, established 
by the international community, even if it is set 
as a percentage of rich countries’ income, seems 
to be a target for inflows to poor countries, rath-
er than effort to be provided by rich countries. 
Again, the need for two measures seems clear. 
0.7% for ever?
 The target of 0.7% ODA/GNI has often been 
criticised for its lack of scientific basis, and even 
of utility. The fact that it has been around for 
so long is both its main strength and its main 
weakness. It would be logical, even legitimate to 
review this target if the measure of aid was itself 
significantly modified. However, abandoning 
it raises serious political difficulties given how 
strongly it symbolises a general commitment by 
developed countries to financing development. 
Complementary targets: GPGs and 
priority to LDCs
 As it will inevitably be maintained, the 0.7% 
target should be supplemented with other tar-
gets in the future development agenda. One 
should cover combined ODA and funding for 
global public goods in developing countries, 
particularly in the area of climate change. 
 Another target should be designed to em-
phasize the priority that must be given to LDCs 
for aid allocation. It is doubtful, for reasons men-
tioned above, that the best way to indicate this 
priority would be to measure aid to LDCs differ-
ently by applying a specific discount rate to cal-
culate the grant element. As already envisaged, 
supplementing the current target of 0.15%-0.2% 
for LDCs with a commitment to award half of 
ODA to LDCs has a good symbolic value. But the 
symbol has another side to it, which reveals the 
limited credibility left to the targets of 0.7% and 
0.15-0.2%: if total ODA falls below 0.3%, adher-
ing to the principle of half of ODA for LDCs will 
not enable the 0.15% target to be reached. If we 
accept the 0.7% target and the principle of one 
half at least for the LDCs, ODA for LDCs would 
need to increase to 0.35%. International do-
nors should guarantee a floor of highly conces-
sional finance to the most vulnerable countries, 
through formal and credible commitments. Re-
serving a share of ODA for the least developed 
countries will be an innovative solution to the 
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